



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - 1963 - A

AD-A147 808

ADF300 494

B R L

MEMORANDUM REPORT BRL-MR-3387



TEST TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF CONTROLLING FRAGMENTATION FROM THE DETONATION OF COLLOCATED MUNITIONS

Philip M. Howe David L. Collis

October 1984



APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

US ARMY BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORY ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND

THE FILE COP

Destroy this report when it is no longer needed. Do not return it to the originator.

Additional copies of this report may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service, U. S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.

The use of trade names or manufacturers' names in this report does not constitute indorsement of any commercial product.

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	READ INSTRUCTIONS BRFORE COMPLETING FORM								
	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER								
MEMORANDUM REPORT BRL-MR- 3387									
4. TITLE (and Subtitio)	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED								
Test to Determine the Feasibility of Controlling									
Fragmentation from the Detonation of Collocated	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER								
7. AUTHOR(a)	S. CONTRACT OF GRANT NUMBER(=)								
Philip M. Howe									
David L. Collis*									
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS								
US Army Ballistic Research Laboratory ATTN: AMXBR-TBD	+								
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5066	1W665804DE91								
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS	12. REPORT DATE								
US Army Ballistic Research Laboratory ATTN: AMXBR-OD-ST	October 1984								
ATTN: AMXBR-OD-ST Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5066	13. NUMBER OF PAGES 51								
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different from Controlling Office)	IS. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)								
	Unclassified								
	II. DECLASSICATION/DOWNGBADING								
	15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE								
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)									
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.									
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, If different from Report)									
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES									
*New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, TERA	A Group								
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)	·								
Explosions, fragment impact, ammunition storage, ma	ss detonations,								
fragment shielding									
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse olds If resectory and identify by block number)	(3)								
A series of tests was run to determine the eff									
ricades in reducing fragment hazards from the deton									
of ammunition. Each test used three M106 8 inch artillery projectiles, deto-									
nated simultaneously, as the fragmentation source. The 8 inch projectile was									
chosen, as it represents essentially a worst case fragment hazard. Simultaneous detonation of a linear array of projectiles in contact (at the rotating band									
covers) creates an exceptionally severe fragment spray - much more severe									
, and a submitted by	(continued)								


SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PA	QE(Mon Data Entered)							
20. ABSTRACT (continued))							
than that produced by three separately detonating, non-interacting rounds. Results showed that a 2 ft thick earthen barrier will permit reduction of the hazardous fragment radius from the standard 1250 ft to well below the 170 ft which was chosen as the objective of this study.								

UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
	LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	5
I.	INTRODUCTION	7
II.	SHIELDING TESTS	7
III.	DISCUSSION	8
IV.	CONCLUSIONS	9
	ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	9
	DISTRIBUTION LIST	49





LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figur	e																								Page
1.	Test	JBA1122A3.	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	11
2.	Test	JBA1123A3.	•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	15
3.	Test	JBA1128A3.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	19
4.	Test	JBA1129A3.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	23
5.	Test	JBA1130A3.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	28
6.	Test	JBA1130B3.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		32
7.	Test	JBA1201A3.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	36
8.	Test	JBA1201B3.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	38
9.	Test	JBA1202A3.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	42
10.	Test.	JBA 1202B3.		_	_	_			_		_	_				_									46

I. INTRODUCTION

New construction of military facilities is subject to Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board review and must comply with the intent of DOD Standard 5154.4s, which specifies explosive safety quantity-distance standard. Failure to generate solutions which comply with these criteria will either delay or prevent the construction of needed facilities. The current criteria which form the limits of the quantity-distance criteria are: (1) a blast overpressure not to exceed a specified peak pressure (1 psi for inhabited buildings, 2.3 psi for R&D facilities involving explosive operations), and (2) hazardous fragments (defined as having 58 ft-lb (78.6 J) or more energy not to exceed a density of more than one per 600 sq ft (55.7 square meters). The arcs associated with these criteria are not intended to provide absolute safety, but are intended to provide an acceptably low level of risk to personnel and material.

The construction of facilities to house explosives operations can follow different design philosophies. One approach involves using sufficiently robust construction that, in the event of an explosion, the structure will survive the blast loading, will prevent excessive blast overpressures external to the building, and will prevent escape of hazardous fragments. If no other alternative is possible, this is an excellent way to go. However, for significant amounts of explosive, the material and structural requirements can become prohibitively high in cost. Under these circumstances, a feasible approach is to design the buildings without the constraint that the buildings survive the blast loading. Explosive safety criteria can still be met if the building prevents the escape of hazardous primary fragments, if the building, in the collapse process, does not itself become a source of secondary hazardous fragments, and if the blast overpressures are not excessive. This latter approach offers the significant advantage that it is generally much, much less expensive to construct buildings using this approach than buildings which completely contain fragments and blast. However, this approach suffers from the fact that engineering guidelines for construction are not readily available.

For the facilities of interest, the blast criteria could be met by limiting explosion size. No attempt was made to take advantage of blast focussing, and buildings could be made of any economically and functionally feasible construction, with the provison that sufficient shielding be provided to prevent escape of an unacceptable number of hazardous fragments. To this end, a series of tests was conducted to establish an acceptable thickness of shielding.

II. SHIELDING TESTS

Soils such as clays and wet sands are low resistance materials which require several projectile lengths of penetration to exert any strong effect upon the velocity of penetration. Gravels offer slightly more resistance, but

ments can be predicted with reasonable accuracy using the Poncelet relation or the Sandia Laboratory's equations. However, fragmenting artillery shells generate a large number of long, sliver-like fragments. These fragments are inherently unstable in penetration, and predictions of required material thickness for stopping are not currently possible. Our problem is complicated further by the fact that the distribution of fragment masses and velocities is quite broad. This latter result arises partially from the nature of the fragmentation process for the individual round and partially from the interaction between rounds, which leads to extremely large fragments travelling at very high velocities (velocities of the order of twice the fragment velocities generated by detonation of an individual round). We therefore decided to rely on results of experimental testing rather than attempt to use theoretical approaches.

Experiments were conducted using three M106 8 inch artillery shells as the source of fragmentation. In each test, the three rounds were arranged collinearly, with the separation between rounds determined by the rotating band covers. All three rounds were detonated simultaneously, to insure the worst possible fragmentation hazard. Shield materials were placed 12 ft (3.6 meters) from the centerline of the three rounds, as this distance is commensurate with the planned distances from explosive source to walls in the proposed building configurations. A 0.62 inch (1.6 mm) steel witness plate was used in each test to determine the number of fragments (see figures for schematics of test configurations). Results are summarized in Table 1 and are outlined in Figures 1-10.

III. DISCUSSION

As noted earlier, the most hazardous fragments are generated in the interaction zones between rounds in contact. Powell, et al, in their studies of the fragmentation generated by detonation of stacks of ammunition, showed quite clearly that the number of high velocity fragments generated by detonation of a stack of ammunition is directly proportional to the number of interaction zones. Our tests, involving three 8 inch projectiles in a row, faithfully reproduce the worst fragmentation hazards for a single pallet of 8 inch projectiles. The fragmentation hazards associated with larger arrays of 8 inch projectiles can easily be inferred by enumerating the interaction zones.

W. Allen. et al. "Dynamics of a Projectile Penetrating Sand, Part I." <u>J.</u>
Appl.Phys. 28, pp 370-376; "Dynamics of a Projectile Penetrating Sand, Part
JI." J. Appl. Phys. 28, pp 1331-1335.

C. Yound, "Low Velocity Earth Penetration Study," Wendover Operation, Sandia Labs SC-TM-66-2611, Sandia, NM (1967).

J. Powell, et al, "Fragment Hazard Investigation Program: Natural Communication Detonation of 155 mm Projectiles," NSWC TR-81-54, Naval Surface Weapons Center (1981).

Examination of the test data shows that several of the tested shield configurations provide acceptable fragment protection, given that the hazardous fragment distance can be as large as 170 ft (50 meters) for the facilities of interest. Thus, it appears that a 2 ft (61.0 cm) thick earth barrier, with a steel retaining wall as thin as 0.016 inches (0.4 mm) thick, will provide adequate fragment protection for simultaneous detonation of three 8 inch M106 projectiles. By inference, the same statement can be made for two pallets of 8 inch projectiles, or two pallets of 155 mm projectiles, or for any other munitions array with less severe fragmentation.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

We conclude, on the basis of a small series of tests, that relatively inexpensive and relatively thick earth barriers are adequate to reduce fragment hazards resulting from detonation of arrays of large caliber projectiles.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This effort was performed for Mr. Richard Baily, Materiel Testing Directorate, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and was supported with funds provided by Materiel Testing Directorate.


Table 1. FRAGMENTATION TESTS

	Wall	Earth Earth	
Test No.	Front Back B	ag Wall Fill	Results
JBA1122A3	0.4 mm corrugated steel	30.5 cm -	Witness sheet found in two pieces, numerous holes.
JBA1123A3	0.4 mm corrugated steel	91.4 cm –	Witness sheet received holes at top and bottom edges
JBA1128A3	6 mm corrugated steel	61.0 cm -	Witness sheet received several holes at left center.
JBA1129A3	4.1 cm wood/ 4.1 cm wood	- 61.0 cm	Witness sheet received three holes.
JBA1130A3	14.0 cm light concrete 0.64 cm plywood sheeting	 B	Witness sheet found in two pieces, numerous holes.
JBA1130B3	4.1 cm wood/ 4.1 cm wood	- 76.2 cm	Witness sheet received one hole in upper right corner.
JBA1201A3	43.2 cm light concrete 0.64 cm plywood sheeting	 g	Witness sheet received numerous holes.
JBA1201B3	0.64 cm steel/ 0.64 cm steel	- 45.7 cm	Witness sheet received one hole at lower left edge.
JBA1202A3	20.3 cm reinforced concrete/0.54 cm plywood		Witness sheet undamaged.
JBA1202B3	0.32 cm steel/ 0.32 cm steel	- 61.0 cm	Witness sheet received one hole at upper center.

DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 12:05 'MST

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST




TARGET WALL DISINTEGRATED. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED IN TWO PIECES WITH NUMEROUS FRAGMENT PERFORATIONS. DAMAGE CONCENTRATED IN CENTER OF SHEET.


Figure 1. Test JBA1122A3

DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 12:05 MST



OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET BEFORE TEST

Figure 1. Test JBA1122A3 (continued)

DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 12:05 MST




CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL CONSTRUCTION DETAIL
BEFORE TEST

Figure 1. TEST JBA1122A3 (continued)

DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 12:05 MST




WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST

Figure 1. Test JBA1122A3 (continued)

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 08:45 MST

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST



RESULTS:

TARGET WALL DISINTEGRATED. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED WITH SLIGHT DAMAGE. SEVEN PERFORATIONS ALONG TOP AND BOTTOM EDGE. APPEARED THAT MOST OF THE PERFORATIONS WERE FROM LOW VELOCITY FRAGMENTS.

Figure 2. Test JBA1123A3

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 08:45 MST



OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET - BEFORE TEST

Figure 2. Test JBA1123A3 (continued)

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 08:45 MST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL CONSTRUCTION DETAIL BEFORE TEST

Figure 2. Test JBA1123A3 (continued)

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 08:45 MST




WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST

Figure 2. Test JBA1123A3 (continued)

DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 09:53 MST

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST



RESULTS:

TARGET WALL DISINTEGRATED. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED WITH NUMEROUS FRAGMENT PERFORATIONS AND IMPACTS. SOME IMPACT DENTS HAD CRACKS IN CENTER.

Figure 3. Test JBA1128A3

DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 09:53 MST



OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET - BEFORE TEST

Figure 3. Test JBA1128A3 (continued)

DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 09:53 MST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL CONSTRUCTION DETAIL BEFORE TEST

Figure 3. Test JBA1128A3 (continued)

DATE: 28 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 09:53 MST




WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST

Figure 3. Test JBA1128A3 (continued)

DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 16:18 MST

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST



TARGET WALL DISINTEGRATED. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED WITH THREE FRAGMENT PERFORATIONS AND ONE PARTIAL PENETRA-TION.

Figure 4. Test JBA1129A3

DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1983






CLOSEUP OF INTERIOR CONSTRUCTION DETAIL OF TARGET WALL,
PRIOR TO EARTH FILL - BEFORE TEST

Figure 4. Test JBA1129A3 (continued)


DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1983




CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL CONSTRUCTION DETAIL
AFTER EARTH FILL WAS ADDED - BEFORE TEST

Figure 4. Test JBA1129A3 (continued)

DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1983



OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET - BEFORE TEST

Figure 4. Test JBA1129A3 (continued)

DATE: 29 NOVEMBER 1983



WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST




CLOSEUP OF PARTIAL PENETRATION OF WITNESS SHEET
AFTER TEST

Figure 4. Test JBA1129A3 (continued)

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 11:29 MST

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST



RESULTS:

TARGET WALL DISINTEGRATED. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED IN TWO PIECES WITH NUMEROUS FRAGMENT PERFORATIONS.


Figure 5. Test JBA1130A3

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 11:29 MST




OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET - BEFORE TEST Figure 5. Test JBA1130A3 (continued)

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 11:29 MST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL CONSTRUCTION DETAIL - BEFORE TEST

Figure 5. Test JBA1130A3 (continued)

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 11:29 MST




WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST

Figure 5. Test JBA1130A3 (continued)

DATE: **30 NOVEMBER 1983**

16:15 MST TIME:

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST




TARGET WALL DISINTEGRATED. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED WITH ONE FRAGMENT PERFORATION.

Figure 6. Test JBA1130B3

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1983



CLOSEUP OF INTERIOR CONSTRUCTION DETAIL OF TARGET WALL
PRIOR TO EARTH FILL - BEFORE TEST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL CONSTRUCTION DETAIL - AFTER EARTH
FILL WAS ADDED - BEFORE TEST
Figure 6. Test JBA1130B3 (continued)

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1983



OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST




CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET - BEFORE TEST Figure 6. Test JBA1130B3 (continued)


TEST: JBA1130B3

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER 1983

TIME: 16:15 MST



WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST



CLOSEUP OF WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE


AFTER TEST

FRAGMENT PERFORATION SHOWN BY ARROW
Figure 6. Test JBA1130B3 (continued)

DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 12:00 MST

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST



TARGET WALL DISINTEGRATED. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED WITH NUMEROUS FRAGMENT PERFORATIONS.


Figure 7. Test JBA1201A3

DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 12:00 MST



OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET - BEFORE TEST Figure 7. Test JBA1201A3 (continued)

DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 12:00 MST



WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST


Figure 7. Test JBA1201A3 (continued)

TEST: JBA1201B3

DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 16:45 MST

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST



FRONT STEEL PORTION OF WALL RECEIVED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. BACK WALL HAD ONE FRAGMENT PERFORATION. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED WITH ONE FRAGMENT PERFORATION.

Figure 8. Test JBA1201B3

TEST: JBA1201B3

DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 16:45 MST



OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST




CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET - BEFORE TEST Figure 8. Test JBA1201B3 (continued)

TEST: JBA1201B3

DATE: 1 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 16:45 MST




WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST FRAGMENT PERFORATION SHOWN BY ARROW

Figure 8. Test JBA1201B3 (continued)

DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 11:15 MST

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST



RESULTS:

TARGET WALL BROKE UP INTO SEVERAL LARGE PIECES. THOSE WHICH WERE RECOVERED FROM ORIGINAL PLACEMENT OUT TO 22.8m WERE LARGER THAN 5cm IN DIAMETER, WHILE THOSE RECOVERED FROM 22.8m to 53.3m WERE SMALLER THAN 5cm IN DIAMETER. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED UNDAMAGED.

Figure 9. Test JBA1202A3

DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 11:15 MST



OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST



CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET - BEFORE TEST Figure 9. Test JBA1202A3 (continued)

DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 11:15 MST




CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL CONSTRUCTION DETAIL - BEFORE TEST

Figure 9. Test JBA1202A3 (continued)

DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 11:15 MST




WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST

Figure 9. Test JBA1202A3 (continued)

DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 15:15 MST

MAGAZINE STORAGE TEST




FRONT STEEL PORTION OF WALL RECEIVED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. BACK WALL HAD ONE FRAGMENT PERFORATION. WITNESS SHEET RECOVERED WITH ONE FRAGMENT PERFORATION.


Figure 10. Test JBA1202B3

DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 15:15 MST




OVERALL VIEW SHOWING SETUP - BEFORE TEST




CLOSEUP OF TARGET WALL AND WITNESS SHEET - BEFORE TEST Figure 10. Test JBA1202B3 (continued)

DATE: 2 DECEMBER 1983

TIME: 15:15 MST



WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST



CLOSEUP OF WITNESS SHEET DAMAGE - AFTER TEST FRAGMENT PERFORATION SHOWN BY ARROW Figure 10. Test JBA1202B3 (continued)

DISTRIBUTION LIST

No. of Copies Organization

- 12 Administrator
 Defense Technical Info Center
 ATTN: DTIC-DDA
 Cameron Station
 Alexandria, VA 22314
- 1 Chairman
 DOD Explosives Safety Board
 ATTN: Dr. T. Zaker
 Room 856-C
 Hoffman Bldg 1
 2461 Eisenhower Avenue
 Alexandria, VA 22331
- 1 Commander
 US Army Materiel Command
 ATTN: AMCDRA-ST
 5001 Eisenhower Avenue
 Alexandria, VA 22333
- 1 Commander
 Armament R&D Center
 US Army AMCCOM
 ATTN: SMCAR-TDC
 Dover, NJ 07801
- 1 Commander
 Armament R&D Center
 US Army AMCCOM
 ATTN: SMCAR-TSS
 Dover, NJ 07801
- 1 Commander
 Armament R&D Center
 US Army AMCCOM
 ATTN: SMCAR-LCE, Dr. P.F. Walker
 Dover, NJ 07801
- 1 Commander
 Armament R&D Center
 US Army AMCCOM
 ATTN: SMCAR-LCE, Dr. N. Slagg
 Dover, NJ 07801
- 1 HQDA DAMA-ART-M Washington, DC 20310

No. of Copies Organization

- 1 Commander
 Armament R&D Center
 US Army AMCCOM
 ATTN: SMCAR-LCN, Dr. P. Harris
 Dover, NJ 07801
- 1 Commander
 US Army Armament, Munitions &
 Chemical Command
 ATTN: AMSMC-LEP-L
 Rock Island, IL 61299
- Director
 Benet Weapons Laboratory
 ARDC, US Army AMCCOM
 ATTN: SMCAR-LCB-TL
 Watervliet, NY 12189
- 1 Commander
 US Army Aviation Research
 and Development Command
 ATTN: AMSAV-E
 4300 Goodfellow Boulevard
 St. Louis, MO 63120
- 1 Director US Army Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA 94035
- 1 Commander
 US Army Communications Rsch
 and Development Command
 ATTN: AMSEL-ATDD
 Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703
- 1 Commander US Army Electronics Research and Development Command Technical Support Activity ATTN: AMDSD-L Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703
- Commander
 US Army Development & Employment
 Agency
 ATTN: MODE-TED-SAB
 Fort Lewis, WA 98433

DISTRIBUTION LIST (Continued)

Copi	of es Organization	No. of Copies	
Copi	es Organization	copies	Olganization
1	Commander	1	Commander
	US Army Missile Command		Naval Sea Systems Command
	ATTN: AMSMI-P		ATTN: Mr. R. Beauregard,
	Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898		SEA 64E
	•		Washington, DC 20360
1	Commander		
	US Army Missile Command	1	Commander
	ATTN: AMSMI-YDL		Naval Explosive Ordnance
	Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898		Disposal Facility
			ATTN: Technical Library
1	Commander		Code 604
	US Army Missile Command		Indian Head, MD 20640
	ATIN: AMSMI-RK, Dr. R.G. Rhoades	_	_ •
	Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898	1	Commander
_			Naval Research Lab
1	Commander		ATTN: Code 6100
	US Army Tank Automotive		Washington, DC 20375
	Command	•	Commandan
	ATTN: AMSTA-TSL	1	Commander
	Warren, MI 48090		Naval Surface Weapons Center
•	Dimenton		ATTN: Code G13
1	Director		Dahlgren, VA 22448
	US Army TRADOC Systems	0	Commander
	Analysis Activity	9	
	ATTN: ATAA-SL		Naval Surface Weapons Center ATTN: Mr. L. Roslund, R122
	White Sands Missile Range NM 88002		Mr. M. Stosz, R121
	NM 88002		Code X211, Lib
_	Commandant		E. Zimet, R13
1	US Army Infantry School		R.R. Bernecker, R13
	ATTN: ATSH-CD-CSO-OR		J.W. Forbes, R13
	Fort Benning, GA 31905		S.J. Jacobs, R10
	Total Domining, On 12200		K. Kim, R13
1	Commander		Dr. C. Dickinson
_	US Army Research Office		Silver Spring, MD 20910
	ATTN: Chemistry Division		6 ,
	P.O. Box 12211	4	Commander
	Research Triangle Park, NC 27709		Naval Weapons Center
			ATTN: Dr. L. Smith, Code 3205
1	Commander		Dr. A. Amster, Code 385
	Office of Naval Research		Dr. R. Reed, Jr., Code 3
	ATTN: Dr. J. Enig, Code 200B		Dr. K. J. Graham, Code 3
	800 N. Quincy Street		China Lake, CA 93555
	Arlington, VA 22217		
	•		
	5	0	
	_		

DISTRIBUTION LIST (Continued)

No. of Copies Organization

No. of Copies Organization

1 Commander

Naval Weapons Station NEDED

ATTN: Dr. Louis Rothstein, Code 50 Yorktown, VA 23691

1 Commander

Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

ATTN: G-4 (NSAP) Norfolk, VA 23511

1 Commander

AFRPL

ATTN: Mr. R. Geisler, Code AFRPL MKPA

Edwards AFB, CA 93523

1 AFWL/SUL Kirtland AFB, NM 87117

1 Director

USA Ballistic Missle Defense Advanced Technology Center ATTN: Dr. David C. Sayles P.O. Box 1500 Huntsville, AL 35807

1 Director

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory P.O. Box 808 ATTN: Dr. M. Finger

Livermore, CA 94550

1 Director

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

ATTN: John Ramsey P.O. Box 1663 Los Alamos, NM 87544

1 Director

Sandia National Lab ATTN: Dr. J. Kennedy Albuquerque, NM 87115

1 New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology

ATTN: TERA, Mr. David L. Collis

Socorro, NM 87801

Aberdeen Proving Ground

Dir, USAMSAA

ATTN: AMXSY -D

AMXSY - MP, II. Cohen

Cdr, USATECOM

ATTn; AMSTE- TO-F

Cdr, APG

ATTN: STEAP-PE Richard Baily

Cdr, CRDC, AMCCOM ATTN: SMCCR-RSP-A SMCCR-MU SMCCR-SPS-IL

USER EVALUATION SHEET/CHANGE OF ADDRESS

This Laboratory undertakes a continuing effort to improve the quality of the reports it publishes. Your comments/answers to the items/questions below will aid us in our efforts.

1. BRL Re	port Number	Date of Report		
2. Date R	eport Received			
3. Does this report satisfy a need? (Comment on purpose, related pro other area of interest for which the report will be used.)				
4. How sp data, proc	ecifically, is the report bedure, source of ideas, etc.	being used? (Information source, design		
as man-hou	rs or dollars saved, opera	rt led to any quantitative savings as far ting costs avoided or efficiencies achieved,		
		hink should be changed to improve future ization, technical content, format, etc.)		
	Name			
CURRENT ADDRESS	Organization			
	Address			
	City, State, Zip			
7. If indi New or Cor	icating a Change of Address rect Address in Block 6 abo	or Address Correction, please provide the ve and the Old or Incorrect address below.		
	Name			
OLD ADDRESS	Organization			
	Address			
	City, State, Zip			

(Remove this sheet along the perforation, fold as indicated, staple or tape closed, and mail.)

US Army Ballistic Research Laboratory
ATTN: AMXBR-OD-ST
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-5066

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. 8300

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL
FRST CLASS PERMIT NO 12062 WASHINGTON, DC
POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Director

US Army Ballistic Research Laboratory

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-9989

ATTN: AMXBR-OD-ST

- FOLD HERE .

Director

FOLD HERE

12-84